Corporate governance ratings for Polish companies
From the perspective of a company, the corporate governance means: independent and efficient supervising body, transparent and accurate books, strong shareholders' rights and equal treatment of all owners groups. Mechanism of corporate governance minimizes the agency costs, i.e. reduces the company's market value loss resulting from a potential conflict between the managers and the owners (Shleifer and Vishny [1996] ).
In Poland, the corporate governance questions have been addressed since the beginning of Authors of PCFG rating indicate at least 60 characteristics that were taken into account for each company in order to obtain appropriate picture of company's corporate governance level.
The indicator variables for the rating were taken from the following areas:
1 -composition and competence of supervisory board incl. independent board members, -supervision over party-related transactions,
-general shareholders meeting accessibility, -functioning of the management board, -auditor's independence, -lack of anti-takeover defences,
-regulations on trading in own shares,
-companies' declared goals and intentions,
-transparency arrangements incl. information available from the companies' websites.
The disclosed rating uses 5 categories: from A-to C+. These were assigned to 53
companies. The authors indicate that the full range of categories include ratings from A to E.
Rating is presented in Table 1 . Dzierzanowski et al. [2004] There are 5 companies rated C+, 17 companies with B-rating, 14 companies with B, 13 with B+ and 4 with A-.
Econometrics and the corporate governance
The econometric research on corporate governance concerns mainly the relationships between various categories representing firm's performance and the variables describing the governance level, such as ownership structure or the composition of supervising body. To properly deal with some of this dangers of econometric modelling in corporate governance it is necessary to use panel data on companies. Börsch-Supan and Köke [2002] indicate several such data bases for Germany.
Corporate governance and economic performance
The recent survey of corporate governance in OECD countries (Corporate governance… [2004] ) indicates that "studies what are considered to be best practice econometric techniques indicate that the corporate governance is an important determinant of performance (…). As with all regression work, the question of "causality" will never be resolved fully to everybody's satisfaction…". Survey authors quote three studies showing significant association between the level of governance and the firms' performance.
In another study, Bøhren and Ødegaard [2001] Corporate governance indices constructed for various countries also have been examined with respect to their association both with economic and market performance of companies.
The examples may be found in Gruszczynski [2003] . In the next section, an attempt is made towards examining the relationship between the corporate governance rating and company's financial performance.
Ordered logit
The corporate governance rating represents a typical dependent variable suitable for ordered response models. The categories are ranked in ascending order and the distances between neighboring categories are not set as equal. For the exposition we assume that the observed corporate governance rating variable y can be equal to one of 5 rating categories, as appearing The use of the observed y values requires the assumption about distribution of errors ε i . Let F be the cumulative distribution function (cdf). The probability of outcome y=m (m=1,...,5) can be written as:
where τ is the vector of cutpoints. In the equation for P(y i = 1⎮x i , β, τ), the second term on the right-hand side is equal 0. Also, in P(y i = 5⎮x i , β, τ), the first term equals 1.
For the ordered probit model, error ε is distributed normally with a mean of 0 and a variance of 1. For the ordered logit model, error ε has logistic distribution. For the sake of model's identification, either constant term or τ 1 is set as equal 0. In the ordered logit: The p i 's lead to form the likelihood function, the maximum of which is attained for the ML estimates of vectors β and τ.
Sample and models
For the purpose of explaining corporate governance rating y of Polish listed companies, the ordered logit models were specified. The endogenous variable y has been defined as:
1) variable CG with all 5 ranking categories appearing in original sample, or:
2) variable CG1 with only 3 categories (first two and the last two have been combined).
The reason for considering also simpler ranking CG1 is the small size of the sample as compared to the number of parameters to be estimated in the logit model. The corporate governance rating composition of 37 companies in the sample is shown in Table 2 . There are 20 financial ratios that have been considered as explanatory variables. The ratios, calculated on the basis of the companies' 2002 financial statements are as follows:
1. Profitability ratios: P102 gross profit from sales margin, P202 operating profit margin, P302 gross profit margin, P402 net profit margin, ROE02 return on equity, ROA02 return on assets.
Liquidity ratios:
L102 current ratio, L202 quick ratio, L302 acid test.
Activity ratios:
A102 amount due turnover, A202 inventory turnover, A302 operating cycle, A402 liabilities turnover, A502 cash conversion cycle, A602 current assets turnover, A702 assets turnover.
Debt ratios:
D102 fixed assets cover ratio, D202 debt margin, D302 EBITDA/financial expenses, D402 debt/EBITDA.
Proper specification of the models requires that between endogenous variable (either CG or CG1) and the ratios -predictor variables there exists significant statistical association. Simple correlation coefficients between the numerical codes of CG or CG1 serve the purpose.
Moreover, in order to overcome multicollinearity problems, from each group of ratios only one variable has been chosen to explain corporate governance variable. It turned out that the following four financial ratios appear to significantly correlate with CG or CG1. These are:
P202 ("+", i.e. positive correlation with CG and CG1),
The strongest degree of correlation with CG and CG1 demonstrate two variables: net profit margin (P202) and the debt leverage ratio (D402). Such outcome confirms the hypotheses, to be found elsewhere (e.g. Gruszczynski [2003] ) that the more profitable and less leveraged companies entertain better provisions for corporate governance.
Both variables, P202 and D402 are included in all specifications. Tables 3 and 4 display the estimation results of two types of models: ordered logit with 5 rating categories (variable CG), and trinomial ordered logit (variable CG1). All estimated models have the coefficients' signs coincident with the direction of simple correlation between CG and CG1 and the variables included into equations. In terms of significance of parameters, the best models seem to be F and B, both with only two predictor variables: net profit margin (P202) and the debt leverage ratio (D402 debt to EBITDA).
The predictive power within the sample for the models A-H is shown in Tables 5 and 6. Tables 5 and 6 is calculated as the ratio of incorrectly predicted companies to total sample size.
Among the models explaining five ranking categories, models C and D seem to be the best for predicting. For the models E-F the result is confusing: model F has the smallest errors in terms of predicted probabilities and also is the worst in terms of predicting number of companies. This is the evidence of instability of results in this research.
Conclusion
The study confirms, that the degree of corporate governance for listed companies in Poland is to some extent correlated with their financial performance. The significant association has been observed between the governance rating and the operating profit margin and also with the debt leverage ratio. The companies with higher profit margin and lower debt leverage ratio are expected to have better rating of corporate governance.
On the other hand, most financial indicators demonstrate no association with corporate governance level. Therefore, there is no strong evidence, that the governance of Polish companies listed on Warsaw Stock Exchange relies on their financial performance. This result is bound by the type of data and the approach used. The corporate governance rating is a composite variable that might not be relevant for directly relating to financial variables. More decisive results can be expected with the use of single indicators of corporate governance, e.g. the CEO turnovers (Gruszczynski [2003] ), managerial remuneration (Aluchna [2004] ) or transparency of books (Gruszczynski, Pajdo [2003] ).
Further studies on corporate governance in Poland are limited by the accessibility of larger data sets for unlisted companies. Hopefully, the growing number companies quoted on the Warsaw Stock Exchange will also help to extend the scope of research in this area.
